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ci: boot the SOC stack's MSI server under its hardening (#1068) - #1074

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Gerrrt merged 1 commit into
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gerrrt/hardened-boot-soc-caddy
Oct 8, 2026
Merged

Gerrrt merged 1 commit into
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gerrrt/hardened-boot-soc-caddy

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@Gerrrt

@Gerrrt Gerrrt commented Oct 8, 2026

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Follows #1072.

Why

#1071's first deploy on odin crash-looped:

[FATAL tini (7)] exec caddy failed: Operation not permitted

The image's caddy binary carries cap_net_bind_service as a file capability, and the compose had dropped every capability. #1072 fixed it. But nothing in CI starts that container: the Boot hardened services job only boots the sensitive tier's five, so odin was the first place the fault showed.

What

  • A new step: check_hardened_boot.sh --stack soc --service caddy, the same check as the sensitive tier's five. It boots the one service from the real compose.yaml on an internal network, waits for its own healthcheck, then reads docker inspect to confirm the container really ran read-only, with CapDrop=ALL and no-new-privileges.
  • The proof cache's key gains stacks/soc/compose.yaml. The proof itself is keyed on the service's resolved config (digest, user, caps) and the script, so a Caddy bump, or a cap_add tidied away, boots again.
  • The Caddyfile stays with Validate configs (check_caddyfile.sh); this step proves the container starts.

Checked

yamllint passes on ci.yml, and seed-validation-env.sh seeds the soc stack's env. There is no docker where this was written, so this PR's own Boot hardened services run is the first boot. No proof is cached for soc/caddy yet, so it boots for real rather than passing from cache.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

#1071's first deploy on odin crash-looped ('exec caddy failed:
Operation not permitted'): the image's caddy binary carries
cap_net_bind_service as a file capability, and the compose had dropped
every capability. Nothing in CI started the container, so odin was the
first place it showed. The hardened-boot job now boots soc/caddy like
the sensitive tier's five, with stacks/soc/compose.yaml in the proof
cache's key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Copilot AI balanced review requested due to automatic review settings October 8, 2026 03:51

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🟢 Approval recommended

The new check correctly exercises the intended service and invalidates its proof when relevant compose inputs change.

0 open findings

What changed in this PR

Adds CI coverage to ensure the SOC MSI server boots successfully under its production hardening.

Changes:

  • Adds SOC Caddy compose inputs to the boot-proof cache key.
  • Boots and health-checks the hardened SOC Caddy service in CI.
File Description
.github/​workflows/​ci.yml Adds cached hardened-boot validation for the SOC MSI server.

🧠 Review effort: Balanced


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@Gerrrt
Gerrrt merged commit b1cb570 into main Oct 8, 2026
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@Gerrrt
Gerrrt deleted the gerrrt/hardened-boot-soc-caddy branch October 8, 2026 04:00
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2 participants