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Wazuh dashboard and Velociraptor GUI answer all of VLAN 30, not only Hicks #1139

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@Gerrrt

The Wazuh dashboard is meant to be reachable from Hicks only. In practice, every host on VLAN 30 can reach it too: the lab segment, which exists to hold attackers. Narrow it to Hicks.

Found while triaging #1009. There, the dashboard is the one Wazuh image with a reachable listener, and two of its critical npm findings (proxy-addr, handlebars) are in server-side code that handles requests, partly before login.

The gap

stacks/soc/compose.yaml:395 publishes the dashboard directly, with no proxy in front:

- "${BIND_ADDR:-0.0.0.0}:${WAZUH_DASHBOARD_PORT:-443}:5601"

BIND_ADDR is 0.0.0.0. odin (10.0.30.60) is single-homed on VLAN 30 (stacks/soc/.env.example:7-10), so that means "all of ImaginationLAN". ADR-0030 records the consumer as "a browser on Hicks" (§ the port table) and calls these "reachable only from Hicks over a rule that already exists". That's true for other segments, but not for VLAN 30 itself. Traffic between VLAN 30 hosts never passes through pfSense, which ADR-0030 itself points out ("every one of these paths is intra-segment"). So today these can also reach odin:443:

  • the six AD guests (.50–.55): the endpoints the SOC watches, and the ones most likely to be compromised first
  • the dotfiles VMs, fenrir, and garuda once built
  • WireGuard peers routed into the lab through phoenix

A pfSense rule can't fix this, because the traffic never reaches pfSense. The filter has to be on odin.

Velociraptor's GUI has the same exposure: ${BIND_ADDR}:8889 (compose.yaml:478), with the same "browser on Hicks" consumer in ADR-0030. It probably belongs in the same change. (8000 and 8003 have real consumers on VLAN 30 and stay as they are.)

Proposed fix

Follow the existing pattern on odin. The SOC stack's Caddy already filters the MSI server on :8448 by source address (stacks/soc/Caddyfile, #1068):

  1. Stop publishing 5601 and 8889 from their containers, and keep them on the soc network only.
  2. Have the stack's Caddy publish 443 and 8889 instead, with remote_ip 10.0.50.0/24 (Hicks) answered and everything else 403, as @six does on :8448.
  3. TLS: both upstreams already serve HTTPS with the generator's certs. So Caddy either proxies to https:// upstreams trusting wazuh/certs/root-ca.pem, or serves its own certificate. If Caddy serves the browser-facing certificate, that overlaps with ADR-0030's follow-up of a lab-CA leaf for the dashboard (Run Velociraptor on Saruman #267).

The alternative is DOCKER-USER iptables rules on odin. That keeps the containers published, but it moves the control out of compose and into host provisioning. Note also that an INPUT/ufw rule would not work: Docker's own rules accept published ports before INPUT sees them.

Caveats to record with the fix, as docs/security.md already does for :8448:

Done when

  • From a VLAN 30 host other than odin (e.g. a dotfiles VM), curl -k https://10.0.30.60/ and :8889 get a 403 or no connection. From Hicks, both log in as before.
  • ADR-0030's "reachable only from Hicks" is corrected by an amendment or note (ADRs are immutable, ADR-0001). docs/security.md gets a threat row for "lab segment reaching the SOC UIs", next to the :8448 row.
  • scripts/check_caddyfile.sh passes for the soc stack.

Refs #1009

Activity

  1. added
    featureA new capability or a change
    securityA credential, an exposure, or a control that is weaker than recorded
    socstacks/soc on odin (VLAN 30)
    on Oct 10, 2026
  2. Gerrrt commented on Nov 12, 2026

    @Gerrrt
    OwnerAuthor

    Done. The Wazuh dashboard and Velociraptor GUI on odin are fenced to Hicks by the stack's Caddy (#1429). The lab-side refusal was proved on 2026-11-10, and the owner logged in to both from Hicks after the fence went in. docs/security.md's threat table records it ("Someone on the lab segment reaching the SOC's web UIs"), as does ADR-0030's note.


    Generated by Claude Code

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    featureA new capability or a changesecurityA credential, an exposure, or a control that is weaker than recordedsocstacks/soc on odin (VLAN 30)

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