Same problem as IATP, different trust anchor: behavior-history scarcity instead of certificates (dsh-vap)

[WangLinChang (Wang-Lin-Chang)]

IATP asks how agents establish trust between each other. dsh-vap (VAP) explores a different anchor for the same problem.

Where certificate/DID approaches bind trust to identity, VAP binds it to verifiable behavior history: forging a bare keypair is free (measured: 0.035 ms/identity), but forging an identity with an audited work history is intercepted 300/300 in our experiment — the only way to fake a credential is to actually do the work. Auditor qualification itself chains back to a genesis anchor, and auditor "water-down" (signing bad envelopes) leaves a public, verifiable trail.

Also in the repo: a lockstep QC-chain consensus (total order / fork & double-spend prevention), dynamic membership with slash auto-expulsion, and a zero-dependency implementation (node: built-ins only). 217 tests, 11 experiment devices, honest boundaries on the front page — including "f+1 collusion is a mathematical limit: detected, not prevented".

Interested in where our approach overlaps or diverges from IATP's design — comments and criticism welcome.